Between the spring of 1585 and the summer of 1586, a group of English Catholic priests led by the Jesuit William Weston, alias Father Edmunds, conducted a series of spectacular exorcisms, principally in the house of a recusant gentleman, Sir George Peckham of Denham, Buckinghamshire. The priests were outlaws – by an act of 1585 the mere presence in England of a Jesuit or seminary priest constituted high treason – and those who sheltered them were guilty of a felony, punishable by death. Yet the exorcisms, though clandestine, drew large crowds, almost certainly in the hundreds, and must have been common knowledge to hundreds more. In 1603, long after the arrest and punishment of those involved, Samuel Harsnett, then chaplain to the bishop of London, wrote a detailed account of the cases, based on sworn statements taken from four of the demo-niacs and one of the priests. It has been recognized since the eighteenth century that Shakespeare was reading Harsnett’s book, *A Declaration of Egregious Popish Impostures*, as he was writing *King Lear*.¹

The relation between these two texts enables us to glimpse with unusual clarity and precision the institutional negotiation and exchange of social energy. The link between *King Lear* and *A Declaration of Egregious Popish Impostures* has been known for centuries, but the knowledge has remained almost entirely inert, locked in the conventional pieties of source study. From Harsnett, we are told, Shakespeare borrowed the names of the foul fiends by whom Edgar, in his disguise as the bedlam beggar Poor Tom, claims to be possessed. From Harsnett too the playwright derived some of the language of madness, several of the attributes of hell, and a number of colorful adjectives. These and other possible borrowings have been carefully cataloged, but the question of their significance has been not only unanswered but, until recently, unmasked.² For a long time the prevailing model for the study of literary sources, a model in effect parceled out between the old historicism and the new criticism, blocked such a question. As a freestanding, self-sufficient, disinterested art work produced by a solitary genius, *King Lear* has only an accidental relation to its sources: they provide a glimpse of the “raw material” that the artist fashioned. Insofar as this “material” is taken

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¹ This chapter was first published in this form in *Shakespearean Negotiations* (1988, pp. 94–128).
seriously at all, it is as part of the work’s “historical background,” a phrase that reduces history to a decorative setting or a convenient, well-lighted pigeonhole. But once the differentiations on which this model is based begin to crumble, then source study is compelled to change its character: history cannot simply be set against literary texts as either stable antithesis or stable background, and the protective isolation of those texts gives way to a sense of their interaction with other texts and hence of the permeability of their boundaries. “When I play with my cat,” writes Montaigne, “who knows if I am not a pastime to her more than she is to me?” When Shakespeare borrows from Harsnett, who knows if Harsnett has not already, in a deep sense, borrowed from Shakespeare’s theater what Shakespeare borrows back? Whose interests are served by the borrowing? And is there a larger cultural text produced by the exchange?

Such questions do not lead, for me at least, to the O altitudo! of radical indeterminacy. They lead rather to an exploration of the institutional strategies in which both King Lear and Harsnett’s Declaration are embedded. These strategies, I suggest, are part of an intense and sustained struggle in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England to redefine the central values of society. Such a redefinition entailed transforming the prevailing standards of judgment and action, rethinking the conceptual categories by which the ruling elites constructed their world and which they attempted to impose on the majority of the population. At the heart of this struggle, which eventuated in a murderous civil war, was the definition of the sacred, a definition that directly involved secular as well as religious institutions, since the legitimacy of the state rested explicitly on its claim to a measure of sacredness. What is the sacred? Who defines and polices its boundaries? How can society distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate claims to sacred authority? In early modern England rivalry among elites competing for the major share of authority was characteristically expressed not only in parliamentary factions but also in bitter struggles over religious doctrine and practice.

Harsnett’s Declaration is a weapon in one such struggle, the attempt by the established and state-supported Church of England to eliminate competing religious authorities by wiping out pockets of rivalrous charisma. Charisma, in Edward Shils’s phrase, is “awe-arousing centrality,” the sense of breaking through the routine into the realm of the “extraordinary” to make direct contact with the ultimate, vital sources of legitimacy, authority, and sacredness. Exorcism was for centuries one of the supreme manifestations in Latin Christianity of this charisma: “In the healing of the possessed,” Peter Brown writes, “the præsentia of the saints was held to be registered with unfailing accuracy, and their ideal power, their potentia, shown most fully and in the most reassuring manner.” Reassuring, that is, not only or even primarily to the demoniac but to the community of believers who bore witness to the ritual and, indeed, through their tears and prayers and thanksgiving, participated in it. For unlike the sorcerer who practiced his art most frequently in the dark corners of the land, in remote rural hamlets and isolated cottages, the charismatic healer depended upon an audience: the great exorcisms of the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance took place at the heart of cities, in churches packed with spectators.
“Great troupes did daily flock thither,” writes the Dominican exorcist Sebastian Michaelis about a series of exorcisms he conducted in Aix-en-Provence in the early seventeenth century, and they were, he argues, deeply moved by what they witnessed. Thus, for example, from the body of the young nun Louise, the demon Verrine cried out “with great and ghastly exclamations” that heretics and sinners would be deprived of the vision of God “for ever, for ever, for ever, for ever, for ever.” The spectators were so “affrighted” with these words “that there gushed from their eyes abundance of tears, when they called to remembrance their offences which they had committed.”

As voluminous contemporary accounts declare, then, exorcisms were moving testimonials to the power of the true faith. But by the late sixteenth century in Protestant England neither the prae sentia nor the potentia of the exorcist was reassuring to religious authorities, and the Anglican church had no desire to treat the urban masses to a spectacle whose edifying value had been called into question. Moving testimonials extorted from the devil himself – praise of the Virgin, awe in the presence of the Eucharist, acknowledgment of the authority of the pope – now seemed both fraudulent and treasonous, and the danger was as great when it came not from a Catholic healer but from a stubbornly nonconforming Protestant. Although the latter did not celebrate the power of the Virgin – when someone tried to invoke Mary’s name at a Protestant exorcism, the presiding exorcist sternly rebuked him, “for there is no other name under Heaven, whereby we may challenge Salvation, but th’ only name of Jesus Christ” – he exalted the power of fasting and prayer and made it clear that this power did not depend upon a state-sponsored ecclesiastical hierarchy. The authorities could easily close the cathedrals to such sedition, but even relatively small assemblies in obscure private houses far from the cities had come to represent a threat.

In the Declaration Harsnett specifically attacks exorcism as practiced by Jesuits, but he had earlier leveled the same charges at a Puritan exorcist. And he does so not, as we might expect, to claim a monopoly on the practice for the Anglican Church but to expose exorcism itself as a fraud. On behalf of established religious and secular authority, Harsnett wishes to cap permanently the great rushing geysers of charisma released in rituals of exorcism. Spiritual potentia will henceforth be distributed with greater moderation and control through the whole of the Anglican hierarchy, at whose pinnacle sits the sole legitimate possessor of absolute charismatic authority, the monarch, Supreme Head of the Church in England.

The arguments that Harsnett marshals against exorcism have a rationalistic cast that may mislead us, for despite appearances we are not dealing with the proto-Enlightenment attempt to construct a rational faith. Harsnett denies the presence of the demonic in those whom Father Edmunds claimed to exorcise but finds it in the exorcists themselves: “And who was the devil, the broacher, herald, and persuader of these unutterable treasons, but Weston [alias Edmunds] the Jesuit, the chief plotter, and . . . all the holy Covey of the twelve devilish comedians in their several turns: for there was neither devil, nor urchin, nor Elf, but themselves” (pp. 154–5). Hence, writes Harsnett, the “Dialogue between Edmunds, & the
devil” was in reality a dialogue between “the devil Edmunds, and Edmunds the devil, for he played both parts himself” (p. 86).

This strategy – the reinscription of evil onto the professed enemies of evil – is one of the characteristic operations of religious authority in the early modern period and has its secular analogues in more recent history when famous revolutionaries are paraded forth to be tried as counter-revolutionaries. The paradigmatic Renaissance instance is the case of the benandanti, analyzed brilliantly by the historian Carlo Ginzburg. The benandanti were members of a northern Italian folk cult who believed that they went forth seasonally to battle with fennel stalks against their enemies, the witches. If the benandanti triumphed, their victory assured the peasants of good harvests; if they lost, the witches would be free to work their mischief. The Inquisition first became interested in the practice in the late sixteenth century; after conducting a series of lengthy inquiries, the Holy Office determined that the cult was demonic and in subsequent interrogations attempted, with some success, to persuade the witch-fighting benandanti that they were themselves witches.

Harsnett does not hope to persuade exorcists that they are devils; he wishes to expose their fraudulence and relies on the state to punish them. But he is not willing to abandon the demonic altogether, and it hovers in his work, half accusation, half metaphor, whenever he refers to Father Edmunds or the pope. Satan’s function was too important for him to be cast off lightly by the early seventeenth-century clerical establishment. The same state church that sponsored the attacks on superstition in A Declaration of Egregious Popish Impostures continued to cooperate, if less enthusiastically than before, in the ferocious prosecutions of witches. These prosecutions, significantly, were handled by the secular judicial apparatus – witchcraft was a criminal offense like aggravated assault or murder – and hence reinforced rather than rivaled the bureaucratic control of authority. The eruption of the demonic into the human world was not denied altogether, but the problem would be processed through the proper secular channels. In cases of witchcraft, the devil was defeated in the courts through the simple expedient of hanging his human agents, not, as in cases of possession, compelled by a spectacular spiritual counterforce to speak out and depart.

Witchcraft then was distinct from possession, and though Harsnett himself is skeptical about accusations of witchcraft, his principal purpose is to expose a nexus of chicanery and delusion in the practice of exorcism. By doing so he hopes to drive the practice out of society’s central zone, to deprive it of its prestige, and to discredit its apparent efficacy. In late antiquity, as Peter Brown has demonstrated, exorcism was based on the model of the Roman judicial system: the exorcist conducted a formal quaestio in which the demon, under torture, was forced to confess the truth. Now, after more than a millennium, this power would once again be vested solely in the state.

Harsnett’s efforts, backed by his powerful superiors, did seriously restrict the practice of exorcism. Canon 72 of the new Church Canons of 1604 ruled that henceforth no minister, unless he had the special permission of his bishop, was to attempt “upon any pretense whatsoever, whether of possession or obsession, by fasting and prayer, to cast out any devil or devils, under pain of the imputation of...
imposture or cozenage and deposition from the ministry.\textsuperscript{12} Since special permission was rarely, if ever, granted, in effect exorcism had been officially halted. But it proved easier to drive exorcism from the center to the periphery than to strip it entirely of its power. Exorcism had been a process of reintegration as well as a manifestation of authority; as the ethnographer Shirokogorov observed of the shamans of Siberia, exorcists could “master” harmful spirits and restore “psychic equilibrium” to whole communities as well as to individuals.\textsuperscript{13} The pronouncements of English bishops could not suddenly banish from the land inner demons who stood, as Peter Brown puts it, “for the intangible emotional undertones of ambiguous situations and for the uncertain motives of refractory individuals.”\textsuperscript{14} The possessed gave voice to the rage, anxiety, and sexual frustration that built up easily in the authoritarian, patriarchal, impoverished, and plague-ridden world of early modern England. The Anglicans attempted to dismantle a corrupt and inadequate therapy without effecting a new and successful cure. In the absence of exorcism Harsnett could offer the possessed only the slender reed of Jacobean medicine; if the recently deciphered journal of the Buckinghamshire physician Richard Napier is at all representative, doctors in the period struggled to treat a significant number of cases of possession.\textsuperscript{15}

But for Harsnett the problem does not really exist, for he argues that the great majority of cases of possession are either fraudulent or subtly called into existence by the ritual designed to treat them. Eliminate the cure and you eliminate the disease. He is forced to concede that at some distant time possession and exorcism were authentic, for Christ himself had driven a legion of unclean spirits out of a possessed man and into the Gadarene swine (Mark 5:1–19); but the age of miracles has passed, and corporeal possession by demons is no longer possible. The spirit abroad is “the spirit of illusion” (\textit{Discovery}, p. A3). Whether they profess to be Catholics or Calvinists does not matter; all modern exorcists practice the same time-honored trade: “the feat of juggling and deluding the people by counterfeit miracles” (\textit{Discovery}, p. A2). Exorcists sometimes contend, Harsnett acknowledges, that the casting out of devils is not a miracle but a wonder – “\textit{mirandum & non miraculum}” – but “both terms spring from one root of wonder or marvel: an effect which a thing strangely done doth procure in the minds of the beholders, as being above the reach of nature and reason” (\textit{Discovery}, p. A4[r–v]).

The significance of exorcism, then, lies not in any intrinsic quality of the ritual or in the character of the marks of possession but in the impression made upon the minds of the spectators. In \textit{The Discovery of Witchcraft} (1584), a remarkable book that greatly influenced Harsnett, Reginald Scot detailed some of the means used to shape this impression: the cunning manipulation of popular superstitions; the exploitation of grief, fear, and credulity; the skillful handling of illusionistic devices developed for the stage; the blending of spectacle and commentary; the deliberate arousal of anxiety coupled with the promise to allay it. Puritan exorcists throw themselves into histrionic paroxysms of prayer; Catholic exorcists deploy holy water, smoldering brimstone, and sacred relics. They seem utterly absorbed in the plight of the wretches who writhe in spectacular contortions, vomit pins, display uncanny strength, foam at the mouth, cry out in weird voices. But all of this apparent absorption in the supernatural crisis is an illusion; there is
nothing real out there on the bed, in the chair, on the pulpit. The only serious action is transpiring in the minds of the audience.

Hence the exorcists take care, notes Harsnett, to practice their craft only when there is “a great assembly gathered together,” and the ritual is then explicitly presented to this assembly with a formal prologue:

The company met, the *Exorcists* do tell them, *what a work of God they have in hand*, and after a long discourse, *how Sathan doth afflict the parties*, and *what strange things they shall see*: the said parties are brought forth, as it were a Bear to the stake, and being either bound in a chair, or otherwise held fast, they fall to their fits, and play their pranks point by point exactly, according as they have been instructed. (*Discovery*, p. 62)

What seems spontaneous is in fact carefully scripted, from the shaping of audience expectations to the rehearsal of the performers. Harsnett grants that to those who suspect no fraud the effect is extraordinarily powerful: “They are cast thereby into a wonderful astonishment” (*Discovery*, p. 70). Aroused by wonder to a heightened state of both attention and suggestibility, the beholders are led to see significance in the smallest gestures of the possessed and to apply that significance to their own lives. But the whole moving process is a dangerous fraud that should be exposed and punished in the courts.

To substantiate these charges the English church needed, in the language of spy stories, to “turn” one of the participants in the spectacle of possession and exorcism. In the mid-1590s the authorities were alerted to the activities of a charismatic Puritan healer named John Darrel. Through fasting and prayer he had helped to exorcise one Thomas Darling, popularly known as the Boy of Burton, and had then gone on to a still greater success in a case of mass possession, known as the Seven in Lancashire. Alarmed by this success, the authorities in 1598 found what they were looking for: William Sommers, aged twenty-one, an unstable musician’s apprentice in Nottingham who was being exorcized by Darrel in a series of spectacular spiritual encounters. Under great pressure Sommers confessed to imposture and exposed – or claimed to expose – Darrel’s secret methods: “As I did use any of the said gestures,” testified Sommers, recalling his first manifestation in Nottingham of the symptoms of possession,

Oh would M. Darrell say, to the standers by: see you not how he doth thus, and thus? These things signify that such and such sins do reign in this town. They also that were present having heard M. Darrell, would as I tossed with my hands, and tumbled up and down upon my bed presently collect and say: oh, he doth so for this sin, and so for that sin, whereby it came to pass, that I could do nothing in any of my fits, either that night or the day after, either stir my head, or any part of my body: look merrily, or sadly, sit or lie, speak or be silent, open or shut mine eyes, but some would still make an interpretation of it: as to be done by the Devil in me, to declare such sins in Nottingham, as they themselves imagined. (*Discovery*, p. 117)

Darrel denied ever offering an interpretation of Sommer’s gestures, but he confirmed the nature of the performance:
This evening, he acted many sins by signs & gestures, most lively representing & shadowing, them out unto us: as namely brawling, quarreling, fighting, swearing, robbing by the highways, picking and cutting of purses, burglary, whoredom, pride in men and women, hypocrisy, sluggishness in hearing of the word, drunkenness, gluttony, also dancing with the toys thereunto belonging, the manner of Antic dancers, the games of dicing and carding, the abuse of the Viol, with other instruments. At the end of sundry of these, he laughed exceedingly, diverse times clapping his hands on his thighs for joy: percase to shadow out the delight, that both himself, and, sinners take in their sins. And at the end of some of them, as killing and stealing, he showed how he brought them to the Gallows, making a sign thereof. (*Discovery*, pp. 118–19)

According to Harsnett, on the Sunday following this display one of Darrel’s colleagues delivered from the pulpit an “authentical reading” of the “dumb show,” and this reading was in turn followed by a popular ballad: a campaign, in short, to extend the exorcist’s influence beyond the immediate circle of beholders to both the elite and the masses. Harsnett, in response, participates in a massive counter-campaign to destroy this influence. Hounding or imprisoning Darrel was not enough, for persecution could easily heighten his popular appeal, and even were he conveniently to disappear, he would be succeeded by others. The exorcist had to be attacked where he had his power: in the minds of beholders or potential beholders.

Accounts of exorcism in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries make it clear that the spectacle of the symptoms of demonic possession had a profoundly disturbing effect on those who witnessed them. The spectacle was evidently more than that of physical or psychic anguish; after all, the men and women of this period would have been accustomed and perhaps hardened to the sight of abject misery. Quite apart from the spectacle of public maimings and executions, an Elizabethan who survived to adolescence must have already been an aficionado of human wretchedness.

Demonic possession was something more: it was utterly strange – a fearful visitation of the perverted spiritual presences of the other world – and at the same time uncannily intimate, for if the demons were exotic tormenters with weird names, the victims were neighbors enduring their trials in altogether familiar surroundings. Hence the testimony taken from those who witnessed the sufferings combines the homely and the bizarre: an evil spirit that appeared in Suffolk became “a thick dark substance about a foot high, like to a sugar loaf, white on the top”; 16 young Mary Glover’s voice sounded to one witness like “the hissing of a violent *squib,*” to another like a “*Hen* that hat the *squack,*** to a third like “the loathsome noise that a *Cat* maketh forcing to cast her gorge” 17; William Sommers’s “entails shot up & down like a weavers shuttle.” 18 Sommers’s cries seemed unutterably strange – he shrieked “with 3 several voices so hideously, and so terribly,” a surgeon reports, “as they were not like any human creature” – but each of the witnesses seems to have tried immediately to place the extraordinary events in the context of the familiar. William Aldred, a preacher, reports that he stood in a crowd of about one hundred fifty persons and watched Sommers having his fits. What he noticed was Darrel praying and preaching; “then the
whole congregation breaking their hitherto continued silence cried out all at once as it were with one voice unto the Lord, to relieve the distressed person: and within a quarter of an hour, or thereabouts it pleased God to hear their prayers.” Joan Pie, the wife of Nottingham baker Robert Pie, also saw the fits; what she noticed was that suddenly Sommers “was plucked round upon a heap, as though his body had lain like a great brown loaf.” Richard Mee, butcher, remarked that Sommers suddenly screeched “like a swine when he is in sticking.”

The domestication of the demonic (a zany Elizabethan version of What Do People Do All Day?) only serves to intensify for most of the witnesses the wonder of the supernatural visitation. Harsnett’s task is to demolish this experience of wonder; he seeks to shine the sharp, clear light of ridicule on the exorcist’s mysteries and thus to expose them as shabby tricks. Among the demoniac’s most frightening symptoms was a running lump – variously described as resembling a kitten, a mouse, a halfpenny white loaf, a goose egg, a French walnut, and a hazelnut – that could be seen under the coverlet, moving across his body as he lay in a trance. One of the bystanders, apparently less awestruck than the rest, impulsively pounced on the lump and found that he had seized Sommers’s hand. In his confession Sommers confirmed that he achieved his effect by no more complicated means than moving his fingers and toes under the coverlet. It seems impossible for this miserable expedient to produce so much as a frisson, but a skeptical witness, quoted by Harsnett, tried it out at home: “And it fell out to be so agreeable with that which the boy did, as my wife being in bed with me, was on the sudden in great fear, that Somers spirit had followed me” (Discovery, p. 240).

Held up to the light, the devil’s coin is a pathetic counterfeit, fit only to frighten women and boys. Yet Harsnett is not content simply to publish Sommers’s confession of fraud, in part, perhaps, because there was reason to believe that the confession was forced, in part because even if Sommers were proven to be a mere actor, other demonics clearly believed in all sincerity that they were possessed by devils. Moreover, the polemic had to be conducted with an odd blend of rhetorical violence and doctrinal caution. “If neither possession, nor witchcraft (contrary to that hath been so long generally & confidently affirmed),” wrote Darrel in his own defense, “why should we think that there are Devils? If no Devils, no God.”

No one in the Anglican church was prepared to deny the existence of Satan, any more than they were prepared to deny the existence of God. What role did Satan play then in the fraudulent dramas in which his name figured so prominently? In the case of Catholic exorcists, Harsnett is prepared to locate the demonic in the very figures who profess themselves to be the agents of God:

Dissemblers, jugglers, impostors, players with God, his son, his angels, his saints: devisers of new devils, feigned tormentors of spirits, usurpers of the key of the bottomless pit, whippers, scourgers, bafoulers of fiends, Pandars, Ganinedeans, enhancers of lust, deflowerers of virgins, defilers of houses, uncivil, unmanly, unnatural venereans, offerers of their own mass to supposed devils, depravers of their own relics, applying them to unspeakable, detestable, monstrous deformities: prostitutes of all the rites, ornaments, and ceremonies of their Church to impure
villainies: profaners of all parts of the service, worship, and honour of God: violators of tombs, sacrilegious, blasphemers of God, the blessed Trinity, and the virgin Mary, in the person of a counterfeit devil: seducers of subjects, plotters, conspirators, contrivers of bloody & detestable treasons, against their anointed Sovereign: it would pose all hell to sample them with such another dozen. (Declaration, pp. 160–1)

In short, they were Jesuits. But Darrel was a Protestant and, by all accounts, a man of austere and upright life. If he could not be portrayed as the devil incarnate, where was the devil to be found? One answer, proposed by Harsnett’s allies John Deacon and John Walker, was that Satan could produce the illusion of demonic possession.

The Devil (being always desirous to work among the dear children of God the greatest disturbance that may be, and finding withal some such lewd disposed person as is naturally inclined to all manner of knavery) he taketh the opportunity of so fit a subject, and worketh so cunningly upon the corruption of that lewd persons nature, as the party himself is easily brought to believe, and to bear others also in hand, that he is (in deed and in truth) essentially possessed of Satan.\textsuperscript{21}

The problem with this argument is that it undermines the clarity and force of the confession of fraudulence the authorities had worked so hard to obtain. That confession was intended to establish a fixed, stable opposition between counterfeit – the false claim of demonic agency – and reality: the unblinking, disen-chanted grasp of the mechanics of illusion mongering. Now after all the devil is discovered hovering behind the demoniac’s performance. And if the Prince of Darkness is actually present, then the alleged evidence of fraudulence need not trouble the exorcist. For as Satan in possessing someone has sought to hide himself under the cover of human agency, so when detected he may wish to convince observers that the signs of possession are counterfeits. “Sathan in his subtlety,” argued Darrel, “hath done in the boy some sleight and trifling things, at divers times, of purpose to deceive the beholders, and to bear them in hand, that he did never greater things in him: thereby to induce them to think, that he was a counterfeit” (Discovery, p. 231).\textsuperscript{22}

If Satan can counterfeit counterfeiting, there can be no definitive confession, and the prospect opens of an infinite regress of disclosure and uncertainty. “How shall I know that this is thou William Somers?” asked Darrel, after the boy confessed to fraud. At first Sommers had been possessed only in body; now, said the exorcist, he is “also possessed in soul” (Discovery, p. 186). As Harsnett perceives, this “circular folly” at the heart of the practice of exorcism prevents a decisive judicial falsification. What Harsnett needs is not further evidence of fraud in particular cases – for such evidence can always be subverted by the same strategy of demonic doubt – but a counter-strategy to disclose fraudulence always and everywhere: in every gesture of the demoniac, in every word and deed of the exorcist. To demystify exorcism definitively, Harsnett must demonstrate not only why the ritual was so empty but why it was so effective, why beholders could be induced to believe that they were witnessing the ultimate confrontation between
good and evil, why a few miserable shifts could produce the experience of horror and wonder. He must identify not merely the specific institutional motives behind exorcism – the treasonous designs of the Catholic Church or the seditious mischief of self-styled Protestant saints – but the source of the extraordinary power in exorcism itself, a power that seems to transcend the specific and contradictory ideological designs of its practitioners. He needs an explanatory model, at once metaphor and analytical tool, by which all beholders will see fraud where once they saw God. Harsnett finds that explanatory model in theater.23

Exorcisms, Harsnett argues, are stage plays, most often tragicomedies, that cunningly conceal their theatrical inauthenticity and hence deprive the spectators of the rational disenchantment that frames the experience of a play. The audience in a theater knows that its misrecognition of reality is temporary, deliberate, and playful; the exorcist seeks to make the misrecognition permanent and invisible. Harsnett is determined to make the spectators see the theater around them, to make them understand that what seems spontaneous is rehearsed, what seems involuntary carefully crafted, what seems unpredictable scripted.

Not all of the participants themselves may fully realize that they are in a stage play. The account in A Declaration of Egregious Popish Impostures presents the exorcists, Father Edmunds and his cohorts, as self-conscious professionals and the demoniacs (mostly impressionable young servingwomen and unstable, down-at-heels young gentlemen) as amateurs subtly drawn into the demonic stage business. Those selected to play the possessed in effect learn their roles without realizing at first that they are roles.

The priests begin by talking conspicuously about successful exorcisms abroad and describing in lurid detail the precise symptoms of the possessed. They then await occasions on which to improvise: a servingman “being pinched with penury, & hunger, did lie but a night, or two, abroad in the fields, and being a melancholic person, was scared with lightning, and thunder, that happened in the night, & lo, an evident sign, that the man was possessed” (p. 24); a dissolute young gentleman “had a spice of the Hysterica passio” or, as it is popularly called, “the Mother” (p. 25),24 and that too is a sign of possession. An inflamed toe, a pain in the side, a fright taken from the sudden leaping of a cat, a fall in the kitchen, an intense depression following the loss of a beloved child – all are occasions for the priests to step forward and detect the awful presence of the demonic, whereupon the young “scholars,” as Harsnett wryly terms the naive performers, “frame themselves jump and fit unto the Priests humors, to mop, mow, jest, rail, rave, roar, commend & discommend, and as the priests would have them, upon fitting occasions (according to the difference of times, places, and comers in) in all things to play the devils accordingly” (p. 38).

To glimpse the designing clerical playwright behind the performance is to transform terrifying supernatural events into a human strategy. One may then glimpse the specific material and symbolic interests served by this particular strategy, above all by its clever disguising of the fact that it is a strategy.

The most obvious means by which the authorities of the English church and state could make manifest the theatricality of exorcism was the command performance: the ability to mime the symptoms at will would, it was argued,
decisively prove the possession a counterfeit. Hence we find the performance test frequently applied in investigations of alleged supernatural visitations. In the 1590s, for example, Ann Kerke was accused of bewitching a child to death and casting the child’s sister into a fit that closely resembled that of a demoniac: “her mouth being drawn aside like a purse, her teeth gnashing together, her mouth foaming, and her eyes staring.” The judge, Lord Anderson, ordered the sister to “show how she was tormented: she said she could not shew it, but when the fit was on her” (p. 100). The reply was taken to be strong corroboration of the authenticity of the charge, and Anne Kerke was hanged.

A similar, if subtler, use of the performance test occurs in the early 1620s. Thomas Perry, known as the Boy of Bilson, would fall into fits upon hearing the opening verse from the Gospel of John; other verses from Scriptures did not have the same effect. Three Catholic priests were called in to exorcise the evil spirit that possessed him. During the boy’s fit – watched by a large crowd – one of the priests commanded the devil “to show by the sheet before him, how he would use one dying out of the Roman Catholic Church? who very unwillingly, yet at length obeyed, tossing, plucking, haling, and biting the sheet, that it did make many to weep and cry forth.” A similar but still fiercer demonstration was evoked in response to the names Luther, Calvin, and Fox. Then, predictably, the priest commanded the devil “to show what power he had on a good Catholic that died out of mortal sin? he thrust down his arms, trembled, holding down his head, and did no more” (p. 51). The Catholics triumphantly published an account of the case, *A Faithful Relation.*

English officials, understandably annoyed by such propaganda, remanded Perry to the custody of the bishop of Coventry and Lichfield. To test if the boy was authentically possessed or “an execrable wretch, who playest the devils part,” the Bishop read aloud the verse that set off the symptoms; the boy fell into fits. When the boy recovered, the bishop told him that he would read the same verse in Greek; once again the boy fell into fits. But in fact the Bishop had not read the correct verse, and the boy had been tricked into performance. Since the Devil was “so ancient a scholar as of almost 6000 years standing” (p. 59), he should have known Greek. The possession was proved to be a counterfeit, and the boy, it is said, confessed that he had been instructed by an old man who promised that he would no longer have to go to school.

The Protestants now produced their own account of the case, *The Boy of Bilson; or, A True Discovery of the Late Notorious Impostures of Certain Romish Priests in Their Pretended Exorcism.* “Although these and the like pranks have been often hissed off the Stage, for stale and gross forgeries,” the author declares, since the Catholics have ventured to publish their version, it is necessary to set the record straight. A reader of the Catholic account should understand that he hath seen a Comedy, wherein the Actors, which present themselves, are these, A crafty old man, teaching the feats and pranks of counterfeiting a person Demonical, and possessed of the Devil; the next, a most docible, subtle, and expert young Boy, far more dextrous in the Practise part, than his Master was in the Theory; after him appear three Romish Priests, the Authors of seduction,
conjuring their only imaginary Devils, which they brought with them; and lastly, a Chorus of credulous people easily seduced, not so much by the subtlety of those Priests, as by their own sottishness. (p. 9)

Performance kills belief; or rather acknowledging theatricality kills the credibility of the supernatural. Hence in the case of William Sommers the authorities not only took the demoniac’s confession of fraud but also insisted that he perform his simulated convulsions before the mayor and three aldermen of Nottingham. If he could act his symptoms, then the possession would be decisively falsified. Darrel countered that “if he can act them all in such manner and form as is deposed, then he is, either still possessed, or more than a man: for no humans power can do the like.”

But the officials denied that the original performances themselves, stripped of the awe that the spectators brought to them, were particularly impressive. Sommers’s possession, Harsnett had said, was a “dumb show” that depended upon an interpretive supplement, a commentary designed at once to intensify and control the response of the audience by explicating both the significance and the relevance of each gesture. Now the state would in effect seize control of the commentary and thereby alter the spectators’ perceptions. Sommers’s audience would no longer see a demoniac; they would see someone playing a demoniac. Demonic possession would become theater.

After the civic officials had satisfied themselves that Sommers’s possession was a theatrical imposture, an ecclesiastical commission was convened to view a repeat performance. In a bizarre twist, however, Sommers unexpectedly withdrew his confession before the startled commissioners, and he signaled this withdrawal by falling into spectacular fits before the moment appointed for the performance. The commissioners, unprepared to view these convulsions as a deliberate or self-conscious exhibition, declared that they were evidently of supernatural origin. But in less than two weeks, before the mayor and two justices, the wretched Sommers, under renewed state pressure, reaffirmed his confession of fraud, and a few days later he once again “proved” his claim by simulating fits, this time before the assize judge. The next step might have been to ask a court of law to determine whether Sommers’s expressly simulated fits were identical to those he underwent when he was not confessing imposture. But the authorities evidently regarded this step, which Darrel himself demanded, as too risky; instead, without calling Sommers to appear, they first obtained a conviction of the exorcist on charges of imposture and then launched a national campaign to persuade the public that possession and exorcism were illicit forms of theater.

Sommers’s oscillation between the poles of authenticity and illusion are for Harsnett an emblem of the maddening doubleness implicit in the theatricality of exorcism: its power to impose itself on beholders and its half-terrifying, half-comic emptiness. Exorcists could, of course, react by demonizing the theater: Puritans like Darrel argued at length that the playhouse was Satan’s temple, while the Jesuit exorcists operating clandestinely in England implied that theatrical representations of the devil in mystery plays were not mere imitations of reality but lively images based on a deep bond of resemblance. When in the 1580s a
devil possessing Sara Williams refused to tell his name, the exorcist, according to the Catholic Book of Miracles, “caused to be drawn upon a piece of paper, the picture of a vice in a play, and the same to be burned with hallowed brimstone, whereat the devil cried out as being grievously tormented.”

Harsnett remarks in response that “it was a pretty part in the old Church-plays, when the nimble Vice would skip up nimbly like Jacke an Apes into the devils neck, and ride the devil a course, and belabour him with his wooden dagger, til he made him roar, whereat the people would laugh to see the devil so vice-haunted” (pp. 114–15).

Sara’s devils, he concludes contemptuously, “be surely some of those old vice-haunted cashiered wooden-beaten devils, that were wont to frequent the stages . . . who are so scared with the Idea of a vice, & a dagger, as they durst never since look a paper-vice in the face” (p. 115). For Harsnett the attempt to demonize the theater merely exposes the theatricality of the demonic; once we acknowledge this theatricality, he suggests, we can correctly perceive the actual genre of the performance: not tragedy but farce.

The theatricality of exorcism, to which the Declaration insistently calls attention, has been noted repeatedly by modern ethnographers who do not share Harsnett’s reforming zeal or his sense of outrage. In an illuminating study of possession among the Ethiopians of Gondar, Michel Leiris notes that the healer carefully instructs the zâr, or spirit, who has seized on someone how to behave: the types of cries appropriate to the occasion, the expected violent contortions, the “decorum,” as Harsnett would put it, of the trance state.

The treatment is in effect an initiation into the performance of the symptoms, which are then cured precisely because they conform to the stereotype of the healing process. One must not conclude, writes Leiris, that there are no “real” – that is, sincerely experienced – cases of possession, for many of the patients (principally young women and slaves) seem genuinely ill, but at the same time no cases are exempt from artifice (pp. 27–8). Between authentic possession, spontaneous and involuntary, and inauthentic possession, simulated to provide a show or to extract some material or moral benefit, there are so many subtle shadings that it is impossible to draw a firm boundary (pp. 94–5). Possession in Gondar is theater, but theater that cannot confess its own theatrical nature, for this is not “theater played” (théâtre joué) but “theater lived” (théâtre vécu), lived not only by the spirit-haunted actor but by the audience. Those who witness a possession may at any moment be themselves possessed, and even if they are untouched by the zâr, they remain participants rather than passive spectators. For the theatrical performance is not shielded from them by an impermeable membrane; possession is extraordinary but not marginal, a heightened but not separate state. In possession, writes Leiris, the collective life itself takes the form of theater (p. 96).

Precisely those qualities that fascinate and charm the ethnographer disgust the embattled clergyman: where Leiris can write of “authentic” possession in the unspoken assurance that none of his readers actually believe in the existence of “zârs,” Harsnett, granted no such assurance and culturally threatened by the alternative vision of reality, struggles to prove that possession is by definition inauthentic; where the former sees a complex ritual integrated into the social process, the latter sees “a Stýgian comedy to make silly people afraid” (p. 69);
where the former sees the theatrical expression of collective life, the latter sees
the theatrical promotion of specific and malevolent institutional interests. And
where Leiris’s central point is that possession is a theater that does not confess its
own theatricality, Harsnett’s concern is to enforce precisely such a confession: the
last 112 pages of A Declaration of Egregious Popish Impostures reprint the “several
Examinations, and confessions of the parties pretended to be possessed, and
dispossessed by Weston the Jesuit, and his adherents: set down word for word
as they were taken upon oath before her Majesty’s Commissioners for causes
Ecclesiastical” (p. 172). These transcripts prove, according to Harsnett, that the
solemn ceremony of exorcism is a “play of sacred miracles,” a “wonderful
pageant” (p. 2), a “devil Theater” (p. 106).

The confession of theatricality, for Harsnett, demolishes exorcism. Theater is
not the disinterested expression of the popular spirit but the indelible mark of
falsity, tawdriness, and rhetorical manipulation. And these sinister qualities are
rendered diabolical by the very concealment of theatricality that so appeals to
Leiris. The spectators do not know that they are responding to a powerful, if
sleazy, tragicomedy; their tears and joy, their transports of “commiseration and
compassion” (p. 74), are rendered up not to a troupe of acknowledged players
but to seditious Puritans or to the supremely dangerous Catholic Church. For
Harsnett the theatrical seduction is not merely a Jesuitical strategy; it is the
essence of the church itself: Catholicism is a “Mimic superstition” (p. 20).

Harsnett’s response is to try to drive the Catholic Church into the theater, just
as during the Reformation Catholic clerical garments – the copes and albs and
amices and stoles that were the glories of medieval textile crafts – were sold to the
players. An actor in a history play taking the part of an English bishop could
conceivably have worn the actual robes of the character he was representing. Far
more than thrift is involved here. The transmigration of a single ecclesiastical
cloak from the vestry to the wardrobe may stand as an emblem of the more
complex and elusive institutional exchanges that are my subject: a sacred sign,
designed to be displayed before a crowd of men and women, is emptied, made
negotiable, traded from one institution to another. Such exchanges are rarely so
tangible; they are not usually registered in inventories, not often sealed with a
cash payment. Nonetheless they occur constantly, for through institutional
negotiation and exchange differentiated expressive systems, distinct cultural
discourses, are fashioned.

What happens when the piece of cloth is passed from the Church to the
playhouse? A consecrated object is reclassified, assigned a cash value, transferred
from a sacred to a profane setting, deemed suitable for the stage. The theater
company is willing to pay for the object not because it contributes to naturalistic
representation but because it still bears a symbolic value, however attenuated. On
the bare Elizabethan stage costumes were particularly important – companies
were willing to pay more for a good costume than for a good play – and that
importance in turn reflected the culture’s fetishistic obsession with clothes as a
mark of status and degree. And if for the theater the acquisition of clerical
garments was a significant appropriation of symbolic power, why would the
Church part with that power? Because for the Anglican polemicists, as for a long
tradition of moralists in the West, the theater signifies the unscrupulous manipulation for profit of popular faith; the cynical use of setting and props to generate unthinking consent; the external and trivialized staging of what should be deeply inward; the tawdry triumph of spectacle over reason; the evacuation of the divine presence from religious mystery, leaving only vivid but empty ceremonies; the transformation of faith into bad faith. Hence selling Catholic vestments to the players was a form of symbolic aggression: a vivid, wry reminder that Catholicism, as Harsnett puts it, is “the Pope’s playhouse.”

This blend of appropriation and aggression is similarly at work in the transfer of possession and exorcism from sacred to profane representation. *A Declaration of Egregious Popish Impostures* takes pains to identify exorcism not merely with “the theatrical” – a category that scarcely exists for Harsnett – but with the actual theater; at issue is not so much a metaphorical concept as a functioning institution. For if Harsnett can drive exorcism into the theater – if he can show that the stately houses in which the rituals were performed were playhouses, that the sacred garments were what he calls a “lousy holy wardrobe” (p. 78), that the terrifying writhings were simulations, that the devils were the “cashiered wooden-beaten” Vices from medieval drama (p. 115), and that the exorcists were “vagabond players, that coast from Town to Town” (p. 149) – then the ceremony and everything for which it stands will, as far as he is concerned, be emptied out. And with this emptying out Harsnett will have driven exorcism from the center to the periphery – in the case of London quite literally to the periphery, where increasingly stringent urban regulation had already driven the public playhouses.

In this symbolically charged zone of pollution, disease, and licentious entertainment Harsnett seeks to situate the practice of exorcism. What had once occurred in solemn glory at the very center of the city would now be staged alongside the culture’s other vulgar spectacles and illusions. Indeed the sense of the theater’s tawdriness, marginality, and emptiness – the sense that everything the players touch is rendered hollow – underlies Harsnett’s analysis not only of exorcism but of the entire Catholic Church. Demonic possession is a particularly attractive cornerstone for such an analysis, not only because of its histrionic intensity but because the theater itself is by its nature bound up with possession. Harsnett did not have to believe that the cult of Dionysus out of which the Greek drama evolved was a cult of possession; even the ordinary and familiar theater of his own time depended upon the apparent transformation of the actor into the voice, the actions, and the face of another.

II

With his characteristic opportunism and artistic self-consciousness, Shakespeare in his first known play, *The Comedy of Errors* (1590), was already toying with the connection between theater, illusion, and spurious possession. Antipholus of Syracuse, accosted by his twin’s mistress, imagines that he is encountering the devil: “Sathan, avoid. I charge thee tempt me not” (4.3.48). The Ephesian...
Antipholus’s wife, Adriana, dismayed by the apparently mad behavior of her husband, imagines that the devil has possessed him, and she dutifully calls in an exorcist: “Good Doctor Pinch, you are a conjurer;/Establish him in his true sense again.” Pinch begins the solemn ritual:

I charge thee, Sathan, hou’d within this man,
To yield possession to my holy prayers,
And to thy state of darkness hie thee straight:
I conjure thee by all the saints in heaven!

(4.4.54–7)

But he is interrupted with a box on the ears from the outraged husband: “Peace, doting wizard, peace! I am not mad.” For the exorcist, such denials only confirm the presence of an evil spirit: “the fiend is strong within him” (4.4.107). At the scene’s end, Antipholus is dragged away to be “bound and laid in some dark room.”

The false presumption of demonic possession in The Comedy of Errors is not the result of deception; it is an instance of what Shakespeare’s source calls a “suppose” – an attempt to make sense of a series of bizarre actions gleefully generated by the comedy’s screwball coincidences. Exorcism is the straw people clutch at when the world seems to have gone mad. In Twelfth Night, written some ten years later, Shakespeare’s view of exorcism, though still comic, has darkened. Possession now is not a mistaken “suppose” but a fraud, a malicious practical joke played on Malvolio. “Pray God he be not bewitch’d!” (3.4.101) Maria piously exclaims at the sight of the cross-gartered, leering gull, and when he is out of earshot, Fabian laughs: “If this were play’d upon a stage now, I could condemn it as an improbable fiction” (3.4.127–8). The theatrical self-consciousness is intensified when Feste the clown is brought in to conduct a mock exorcism: “I would I were the first that ever dissembled in such a gown” (4.2.5–6), he remarks sententiously as he disguises himself as Sir Topas the curate. If the jibe had a specific reference for the play’s original audience, it would be to the Puritan Darrel, who had only recently been convicted of dissembling in the exorcism of Sommers. Now, the scene would suggest, the tables are being turned on the self-righteous fanatic. “Good Sir Topas,” pleads Malvolio, “do not think I am mad; they have laid me here in hideous darkness.” “Fie, thou dishonest Sathan!” Feste replies; “I call thee by the most modest terms, for I am one of those gentle ones that will use the devil himself with courtesy” (4.2.29–33).

By 1600, then, Shakespeare had clearly marked out possession and exorcism as frauds, so much so that in All’s Well That Ends Well a few years later he could casually use the term exorcist as a synonym for illusion monger: “Is there no exorcist / Beguiles the truer office of mine eyes?” cries the King of France when Helena, whom he thought dead, appears before him; “Is’t real that I see?” (5.3.304–6). When in 1603 Harsnett was whipping exorcism toward the theater, Shakespeare was already at the entrance to the Globe to welcome it.

Given Harsnett’s frequent expressions of the “antitheatrical prejudice,” this welcome may seem strange, but in fact nothing in A Declaration of Egregious Popish
Impostures necessarily implies hostility to the theater as a professional institution. It was Darrel, not Harsnett, who represented an implacable threat to the theater, for where the Anglican polemicist saw the theatrical in the demonic, the Puritan polemicist saw the demonic in the theatrical: “The Devil,” wrote Stephen Gosson, “is the efficient cause of plays.” Harsnett’s work attacks a form of theater that pretends it is not entertainment but sober reality; his polemic virtually depends upon the existence of an officially designated commercial theater, marked off openly from all other forms and ceremonies of public life precisely by virtue of its freely acknowledged fictionality. Where there is no pretense to truth, there can be no imposture: this argument permits so ontologically anxious a figure as Sir Philip Sidney to defend poetry – “Now for the poet, he nothing affirms, and therefore never lieth.”

In this spirit Puck playfully defends *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*:

> If we shadows have offended,
> Think but this, and all is mended,
> That you have but slumb’red here
> While these visions did appear.
> And this weak and idle theme,
> No more yielding but a dream.

(5.1.423–8)

With a similarly frank admission of illusion Shakespeare can open the theater to Harsnett’s polemic. Indeed, as if Harsnett’s momentum carried him into the theater along with the fraud he hotly pursues, Shakespeare in *King Lear* stages not only exorcism, but Harsnett on exorcism: “Five fiends have been in poor Tom at once: of lust, as Obidicut; Hobbididence, prince of dumbness; Mahu, of stealing; Modo, of murder; Flibbertigibbet, of mopping and mowing, who since possesses chambermaids and waiting-women” (4.1.58–63).

Those in the audience who had read Harsnett’s book or heard of the notorious Buckinghamshire exorcisms would recognize in Edgar’s lines an odd joking allusion to the chambermaids, Sara and Friswood Williams, and the waiting woman, Ann Smith, principal actors in Father Edmunds’s “devil Theater.” The humor of the anachronism here is akin to that of the Fool’s earlier quip, “This prophecy Merlin shall make, for I live before his time” (3.2.95–6); both sallies of wit show a cheeky self-consciousness that dares deliberately to violate the historical setting to remind the audience of the play’s conspicuous doubleness, its simultaneous distance and contemporaneity.

*A Declaration of Egregious Popish Impostures* supplies Shakespeare not only with an uncanny anachronism but also with the model for Edgar’s histrionic disguise. For it is not the authenticity of the demonology that the playwright finds in Harsnett – the usual reason for authorial recourse to a specialized source (as, for example, to a military or legal handbook) – but rather the inauthenticity of a theatrical role. Shakespeare appropriates for Edgar a documented fraud, complete with an impressive collection of what the *Declaration* calls “uncouth non-significant names” (p. 46) that have been made up to sound exotic and that carry with them a faint but ineradicable odor of spuriousness.
In Sidney’s *Arcadia*, which provided the outline of the Gloucester subplot, the good son, having escaped his father’s misguided attempt to kill him, becomes a soldier in another land and quickly distinguishes himself. Shakespeare insists not only on Edgar’s perilous fall from his father’s favor but upon his marginalization: Edgar becomes the possessed Poor Tom, the outcast with no possibility of working his way back toward the center. “My neighbors,” writes John Bunyan in the 1660s, “were amazed at this my great conversion from prodigious profaneness to something like a moral life; and truly so well they might for this my conversion was as great as for a Tom of Bethlem to become a sober man.” Although Edgar is only a pretend Tom o’ Bedlam and can return to the community when it is safe to do so, the force of Harsnett’s argument makes mimed possession even more marginal and desperate than the real thing.

Indeed Edgar’s desperation is bound up with the stress of “counterfeiting,” a stress he has already noted in the presence of the mad and ruined Lear and now, in the lines I have just quoted, feels more intensely in the presence of his blinded and ruined father. He is struggling with the urge to stop playing or, as he puts it, with the feeling that he “cannot daub it further” (4.1.52). Why he does not simply reveal himself to Gloucester at this point is unclear. “And yet I must” is all he says of his continued disguise, as he recites the catalog of devils and leads his despairing father off to Dover Cliff.

The subsequent episode – Gloucester’s suicide attempt – deepens the play’s brooding upon spurious exorcism. “It is a good *decorum* in a Comedy,” writes Harsnett, “to give us empty names for things, and to tell us of strange Monsters within, where there be none” (p. 142); so too the “Miracle-minter” Father Edmunds and his fellow exorcists manipulate their impressionable gulls: “The priests do report often in their patients hearing the dreadful forms, similitudes, and shapes, that the devils use to depart in out of those possessed bodies . . . and this they tell with so grave a countenance, pathetical terms, and accommodate action, as it leaves a very deep impression in the memory, and fancy of their actors” (pp. 142–3). Thus by the power of theatrical suggestion the anxious subjects on whom the priests work their charms come to believe that they too have witnessed the devil depart in grotesque form from their own bodies, whereupon the priests turn their eyes heavenward and give thanks to the Blessed Virgin. In much the same manner Edgar persuades Gloucester that he stands on a high cliff, and then, after his credulous father has flung himself forward, Edgar switches roles and pretends that he is a bystander who has seen a demon depart from the old man:

As I stood here below, methought his eyes  
Were two full moons; he had a thousand noses,  
Horns welk’d and waved like the enridged sea.  
It was some fiend; therefore, thou happy father,  
Think that the clearest gods, who make them honors  
Of men’s impossibilities, have preserved thee.

(4.6.69–74)
Edgar tries to create in Gloucester an experience of awe and wonder so intense that it can shatter his suicidal despair and restore his faith in the benevolence of the gods: “Thy life’s a miracle” (4.6.55), he tells his father. For Shakespeare as for Harsnett this miracle minting is the product of specifically histrionic manipulations; the scene at Dover is a disenchanted analysis of both religious and theatrical illusions. Walking about on a perfectly flat stage, Edgar does to Gloucester what the theater usually does to the audience: he persuades his father to discount the evidence of his senses—“Methinks the ground is even”—and to accept a palpable fiction: “Horrible steep” (4.6.3). But the audience at a play never absolutely accepts such fictions: we enjoy being brazenly lied to, we welcome for the sake of pleasure what we know to be untrue, but we withhold from the theater the simple assent we grant to everyday reality. And we enact this withholding when, depending on the staging, either we refuse to believe that Gloucester is on a cliff above Dover Beach or we realize that what we thought was a cliff (in the convention of theatrical representation) is in reality flat ground.

Hence in the midst of the apparent convergence of exorcism and theater, we return to the difference that enables King Lear to borrow comfortably from Harsnett: the theater elicits from us complicity rather than belief. Demonic possession is responsibly marked out for the audience as a theatrical fraud, designed to gull the unsuspecting: monsters such as the fiend with the thousand noses are illusions most easily imposed on the old, the blind, and the despairing; evil comes not from the mysterious otherworld of demons but from this world, the world of court and family intrigue. In King Lear there are no ghosts, as there are in Richard III, Julius Caesar, or Hamlet; no witches, as in Macbeth; no mysterious music of departing daemons, as in Antony and Cleopatra.

King Lear is haunted by a sense of rituals and beliefs that are no longer efficacious, that have been emptied out. The characters appeal again and again to the pagan gods, but the gods remain utterly silent. Nothing answers to human questions but human voices; nothing breeds about the heart but human desires; nothing inspires awe or terror but human suffering and human depravity. For all the invocation of the gods in King Lear, it is clear that there are no devils.

Edgar is no more possessed than the sanest of us, and we can see for ourselves that there was no demon standing by Gloucester’s side. Likewise Lear’s madness has no supernatural origin; it is linked, as in Harsnett, to hysterica passio, exposure to the elements, and extreme anguish, and its cure comes at the hands not of an exorcist but of a doctor. His prescription involves neither religious rituals (as in Catholicism) nor fasting and prayer (as in Puritanism) but tranquilized sleep:

Our foster-nurse of nature is repose,
The which he lacks; that to provoke in him
Are many simples operative, whose power
Will close the eye of anguish.

(4.4.12–15)

King Lear’s relation to Harsnett’s book is one of reiteration then, a reiteration that signals a deeper and unexpressed institutional exchange. The official church
dismantles and cedes to the players the powerful mechanisms of an unwanted and dangerous charisma; in return the players confirm the charge that those mechanisms are theatrical and hence illusory. The material structure of Elizabethan and Jacobean public theaters heightened this confirmation; unlike medieval drama, which was more fully integrated into society, Shakespeare’s drama took place in carefully demarcated playgrounds. *King Lear* offers a double corroboration of Harsnett’s arguments. Within the play, Edgar’s possession is clearly designated as a fiction, and the play itself is bounded by the institutional signs of fictionality: the wooden walls of the play space, payment for admission, known actors playing the parts, applause, the dances that followed the performance.

The theatrical confirmation of the official position is neither superficial nor unstable. And yet, I want now to suggest, Harsnett’s arguments are alienated from themselves when they make their appearance on the Shakespearean stage. This alienation may be set in the context of a more general observation: the closer Shakespeare seems to a source, the more faithfully he reproduces it on stage, the more devastating and decisive his transformation of it. Let us take, for a small initial instance, Shakespeare’s borrowing from Harsnett of the unusual adjective *corky*—that is, sapless, dry, withered. The word appears in the *Declaration* in the course of a sardonic explanation of why, despite the canonist Mengus’s rule that only old women are to be exorcised, Father Edmunds and his crew have a particular fondness for tying in a chair and exorcising young women. Along with more graphic sexual innuendos, Harsnett observes that the theatrical role of a demoniac requires “certain actions, motions, distortions, dislocations, writhings, tumblings, and turbulent passions . . . not to be performed but by suppleness of sinews . . . . It would (I fear me) pose all the cunning Exorcists, that are this day to be found, to teach an old corky woman to writhe, tumble, curvet, and fetch her morris gambols” (p. 23).

Now Shakespeare’s eye was caught by the word “corky,” and he reproduces it in a reference to old Gloucester. But what had been a flourish of Harsnett’s typically bullying comic style becomes part of the horror of an almost unendurable scene, a scene of torture that begins when Cornwall orders his servant to take the captive Gloucester and “Bind fast his corky arms” (3.7.29). The note of bullying humor is still present in the word, but it is present in the character of the torturer.

This one-word instance of repetition as transvaluation may suggest in the smallest compass what happens to Harsnett’s work in the course of *Lear*. The *Declaration*’s arguments are loyally reiterated, but in a curiously divided form. The voice of skepticism is assimilated to Cornwall, to Goneril, and above all to Edmund, whose “naturalism” is exposed as the argument of the younger and illegitimate son bent on displacing his legitimate older brother and eventually on destroying his father. The fraudulent possession and exorcism are given to the legitimate Edgar, who is forced to such shifts by the nightmarish persecution directed against him. Edgar adopts the role of Poor Tom not out of a corrupt will to deceive but out of a commendable desire to survive. Modo, Mahu, and the rest are fakes, exactly as Harsnett said they were, but Edgar’s impostures are the venial sins of a will to endure. And even “venial sins” is too strong: the clever
inventions enable a decent and unjustly persecuted man to live. Similarly, there is no grotesque monster standing on the cliff with Gloucester – there is not even a cliff – but only Edgar, himself hunted down like an animal, trying desperately to save his father from suicidal despair.

All of this has an odd and unsettling resemblance to the situation of the Jesuits in England, if viewed from an unofficial perspective. The resemblance does not necessarily resolve itself into an allegory in which Catholicism is revealed to be the persecuted legitimate elder brother forced to defend himself by means of theatrical illusions against the cold persecution of his skeptical bastard brother Protestantism. But the possibility of such a radical undermining of the orthodox position exists, and not merely in the cool light of our own historical distance. In 1610 a company of traveling players in Yorkshire included *King Lear* and *Pericles* in a repertoire that included a “St. Christopher Play” whose performance came to the attention of the Star Chamber. The plays were performed in the manor house of a recusant couple, Sir John and Lady Juliana Yorke, and the players themselves and their organizer, Sir Richard Cholmeley, were denounced for recusancy by their Puritan neighbor, Sir Posthumus Hoby. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that someone in Stuart Yorkshire believed that *King Lear*, despite its apparent staging of a fraudulent possession, was not hostile, was strangely sympathetic even, to the situation of persecuted Catholics. At the very least, we may suggest, the current of sympathy is enough to undermine the intended effect of Harsnett’s Declaration: an intensified adherence to the central system of official values. In Shakespeare, the realization that demonic possession is a theatrical imposture leads not to a clarification – the clear-eyed satisfaction of the man who refuses to be gulléd – but to a deeper uncertainty, a loss of moorings, in the face of evil.

“Let them anatomize Regan,” Lear raves, “see what breeds about her heart. Is there any cause in nature that make these hard hearts?” (3.6.76–8). We know that there is no cause beyond nature; the voices of evil in the play – “Thou, Nature, art my goddess”; “What need one?”; “Bind fast his corky arms” – do not well up from characters who are possessed. I have no wish to live in a culture where men believe in devils; I fully grasp that the torturers of this world are all too human. Yet Lear’s anguished question insists on the pain this understanding brings, a pain that reaches beyond the king. Is it a relief to understand that the evil was not visited upon the characters by demonic agents but released from the structure of the family and the state by Lear himself?

Edgar’s pretended demonic possession, by ironic contrast, is homiletic; the devil compels him to acts of self-punishment, the desperate masochism of the very poor, but not to acts of viciousness. Like the demoniacs who in Harsnett’s contemptuous account praise the Mass and the Catholic Church, Poor Tom gives a highly moral performance: “Take heed o’ th’ foul fiend. Obey thy parents, keep thy word’s justice, swear not, commit not with man’s sworn spouse, set not thy sweet heart on proud array. Tom’s a-cold” (3.4.80–3). Is it a relief to know that Edgar only mimes this little sermon?

All attempts by the characters to explain or relieve their sufferings through the invocation of transcendent forces are baffled. Gloucester’s belief in the influence
of “these late eclipses in the sun and moon” (1.2.103) is dismissed decisively, even if the spokesman for the dismissal is the villainous Edmund. Lear appeals almost constantly to the gods:

O Heavens!
If you do love old men, if your sweet sway
Allow obedience, if you yourselves are old,
Make it your cause; send down, and take my part.

(2.4.189–92)

But his appeals are left unanswered. The storm in the play seems to several characters to be of more than natural intensity, and Lear above all tries desperately to make it mean something (as a symbol of his daughters’ ingratitude, a punishment for evil, a sign from the gods of the impending universal judgment), but the thunder refuses to speak. When Albany calls Goneril a “devil” and a “fiend” (4.2.59, 66), we know that he is not identifying her as a supernatural being – it is impossible, in this play, to witness the eruption of the denizens of hell into the human world – just as we know that Albany’s prayer for “visible spirits” to be sent down by the heavens “to tame these vild offenses” (4.2.46–47) will be unanswered.

In King Lear, as Harsnett says of the Catholic Church, “neither God, Angel, nor devil can be gotten to speak” (p. 169). For Harsnett this silence betokens a liberation from lies; we have learned, as the last sentence of his tract puts it, “to loathe these despicable Impostures and return unto the truth” (Declaration, p. 171). But for Shakespeare the silence leads to the desolation of the play’s close:

Lend me a looking-glass,
If that her breath will mist or stain the stone,
Why then she lives.

(5.3.262–4)

The lines voice a hope that has repeatedly tantalized the audience: a hope that Cordelia will not die, that the play will build toward a revelation powerful enough to justify Lear’s atrocious suffering, that we are in the midst of what the Italians called a tragedia di fin lieto, that is, a play in which the villains absorb the tragic punishment while the good are wondrously restored. Lear appeals, in effect, to the conventions of this genre. The close of a tragicomedy frequently requires the audience to will imaginatively a miraculous turn of events, often against the evidence of its senses (as when the audience persuades itself that the two actors playing Viola and Sebastian in Twelfth Night really do look identical, in spite of the ocular proof to the contrary, or when at the close of The Winter’s Tale the audience accepts the fiction that Hermione is an unbreathing statue in order to experience the wonder of her resurrection). But the close of King Lear allows an appeal to such conventions only to reverse them with bitter irony: to believe Cordelia dead, the audience, insofar as it can actually see what is occurring onstage, must work against the evidence of its own senses. After all, the actor’s
breath would have misted the stone, and the feather held to Cordelia’s mouth must have stirred. But we remain convinced that Cordelia is, as Lear first says, “dead as earth.”

In the wake of Lear’s first attempt to see some sign of life in Cordelia, Kent asks, “Is this the promis’d end?” Edgar echoes the question: “Or image of that horror?” And Albany says, “Fall, and cease!” By itself Kent’s question has an oddly literary quality, as if he were remarking on the end of the play, either wondering what kind of ending this is or implicitly objecting to the disastrous turn of events. Edgar’s response suggests that the “end” is the end of the world, the Last Judgment, here experienced not as a “promise” – the punishment of the wicked, the reward of the good – but as a “horror.” But like Kent, Edgar is not certain about what he is seeing: his question suggests that he may be witnessing not the end itself but a possible “image” of it, while Albany’s enigmatic “Fall, and cease!” empties even that image of significance. The theatrical means that might have produced a “counterfeit miracle” out of this moment are abjured; there will be no imposture, no histrionic revelation of the supernatural.

Lear repeats this miserable emptying out of the redemptive hope in his next lines:

This feather stirs, she lives! If it be so,
It is a chance which does redeem all sorrows
That ever I have felt.

(5.3.266–8)

Deeply moved by the sight of the mad king, a nameless gentleman had earlier remarked,

Thou hast one daughter
Who redeems nature from the general curse
Which twain have brought her to.

(4.6.205–7)

Now in Lear’s words this vision of universal redemption through Cordelia is glimpsed again, intensified by the king’s conscious investment in it.

What would it mean to “redeem” Lear’s sorrows? To buy them back from the chaos and brute meaninglessness they now seem to signify? To reward the king with a gift so great that it outweighs the sum of misery in his entire long life? To reinterpret his pain as the necessary preparation – the price to be paid – for a consummate bliss? In the theater such reinterpretation would be represented by a spectacular turn in the plot – a surprise unmasking, a sudden reversal of fortunes, a resurrection – and this dramatic redemption, however secularized, would almost invariably recall the consummation devoutly wished by centuries of Christian believers. This consummation had in fact been represented again and again in medieval Resurrection plays, which offered the spectators ocular proof that Christ had risen. Despite the pre-Christian setting of Shakespeare’s play, Lear’s craving for just such proof – “This feather stirs, she lives!” – would seem to
evoke precisely this theatrical and religious tradition, but only to reveal itself, in C. L. Barber’s acute phrase, as “post-Christian.” If it be so: Lear’s sorrows are not redeemed; nothing can turn them into joy, but the forlorn hope of an impossible redemption persists, drained of its institutional and doctrinal significance, empty and vain, cut off even from a theatrical realization, but like the dream of exorcism, ineradicable.

The close of King Lear in effect acknowledges that it can never satisfy this dream, but the acknowledgment must not obscure the play’s having generated the craving for such satisfaction. That is, Shakespeare does not simply inherit and make use of an anthropological given; rather, at the moment when the official religious and secular institutions are, for their own reasons, abjuring the ritual they themselves once fostered, Shakespeare’s theater moves to appropriate it. Onstage the ritual is effectively contained in the ways we have examined, but Shakespeare intensifies as a theatrical experience the need for exorcism, and his demystification of the practice is not identical in its interests to Harsnett’s.

Harsnett’s polemic is directed toward a bracing anger against the lying agents of the Catholic Church and a loyal adherence to the true established Church of England. He writes as a representative of that true church, and this institutional identity is reinforced by the secular institutional imprimatur on the confessions that are appended to the Declaration. The joint religious and secular apparatus works to strip away imposture and discover the hidden reality that is, Harsnett says, the theater. Shakespeare’s play dutifully reiterates this discovery: when Lear thinks he has found in Poor Tom “the thing itself,” “unaccommodated man,” he has in fact found a man playing a theatrical role. But if false religion is theater, and if the difference between true and false religion is the presence of theater, what happens when this difference is enacted in the theater?

What happens, as we have already begun to see, is that the official position is emptied out, even as it is loyally confirmed. This “emptying out” resembles Brecht’s “alienation effect” and, even more, Althusser and Macheray’s “internal distantiation.” But the most fruitful terms for describing the felt difference between Shakespeare’s art and the religious ideology to which it gives voice are to be found, I think, in the theological system to which Harsnett adhered. What is the status of the Law, asks Hooker, after the coming of Christ? Clearly the Savior effected the “evacuation of the Law of Moses.” But did that abolition mean “that the very name of Altar, of Priest, of Sacrifice itself, should be banished out of the world”? No, replies Hooker; even after evacuation, “the words which were do continue: the only difference is, that whereas before they had a literal, they now have a metaphorical use, and are as so many notes of remembrance unto us, that what they did signify in the letter is accomplished – with a drastic swerve from the sacred to the secular – in the theater.

Edgar’s possession is a theatrical performance exactly in Harsnett’s terms, but there is no saving institution, purged of theater, against which it may be set, nor is
there a demonic institution that the performance may be shown to serve. On the contrary, Edgar mimes in response to a free-floating, contagious evil more terrible than anything Harsnett would allow. For Harsnett the wicked are corrupt individuals in the service of a corrupt church; in *King Lear* neither individuals nor institutions can adequately contain the released and enacted wickedness; the force of evil in the play is larger than any local habitation or name. In this sense, Shakespeare’s tragedy reconstitutes as theater the demonic principle demystified by Harsnett. Edgar’s fraudulent, histrionic performance is a response to this principle: evacuated rituals, drained of their original meaning, are preferable to no rituals at all.

Shakespeare does not counsel, in effect, that for the dream of a cure one accept the fraudulent institution as true – that is the argument of the Grand Inquisitor. He writes for the greater glory and profit of the theater, a fraudulent institution that never pretends to be anything but fraudulent, an institution that calls forth what is not, that signifies absence, that transforms the literal into the metaphorical, that evacuates everything it represents. By doing so the theater makes for itself the hollow round space within which it survives. The force of *King Lear* is to make us love the theater, to seek out its satisfactions, to serve its interests, to confer on it a place of its own, to grant it life by permitting it to reproduce itself over generations. Shakespeare’s theater has outlived the institutions to which it paid homage, has lived to pay homage to other, competing, institutions that in turn it seems to represent and empty out. This complex, limited institutional independence, this marginal and impure autonomy, arises not out of an inherent, formal self-reflexiveness but out of the ideological matrix in which Shakespeare’s theater is created and re-created.

Further institutional strategies lie beyond a love for the theater. In a move that Ben Jonson rather than Shakespeare seems to have anticipated, the theater itself comes to be emptied out in the interests of reading. In the argument made famous by Charles Lamb and Coleridge, and reiterated by Bradley, theatricality must be discarded to achieve absorption, and Shakespeare’s imagination yields forth its sublime power not to a spectator but to one who, like Keats, sits down to reread *King Lear*. Where institutions like the King’s Men had been thought to generate their texts, now texts like *King Lear* appear to generate their institutions. The commercial contingency of the theater gives way to the philosophical necessity of literature.

Why has our culture embraced *King Lear*’s massive display of mimed suffering and fraudulent exorcism? Because the judicial torture and expulsion of evil have for centuries been bound up with the display of power at the center of society. Because we no longer believe in the magical ceremonies through which devils were once made to speak and were driven out of the bodies of the possessed. Because the play recuperates and intensifies our need for these ceremonies, even though we do not believe in them, and performs them, carefully marked out for us as frauds, for our continued consumption. Because with our full complicity Shakespeare’s company and scores of companies that followed have catered profitably to our desire for spectacular impostures.
And also, perhaps, because the Harsnetts of the world would free us from the oppression of false belief only to reclaim us more firmly for the official State Church, and the “solution” – confirmed by the rechristening, as it were, of the devil as the pope – is hateful. Hence we embrace an alternative that seems to confirm the official line, and thereby to take its place in the central system of values, yet at the same time works to unsettle all official lines. Shakespeare’s theater empties out the center that it represents and in its cruelty – Edmund, Goneril, Regan, Cornwall, Gloucester, Cordelia, Lear: all dead as earth – paradoxically creates in us the intimation of a fullness that we can savor only in the conviction of its irremediable loss:

we that are young
Shall never see so much, nor live so long.

NOTES

1 Samuel Harsnett, A Declaration of egregious Popish Impostures, to withdraw the harts of her Maiesties Subjects from their allegiance, and from the truth of Christian Religion professed in England, under the pretence of casting out devils (London: James Roberts, 1603). Harsnett’s influence is noted in Lewis Theobald’s edition of Shakespeare, first published in 1733. Shakespeare is likely to have known one of the principal exorcists, Robert Dibdale, the son of a Stratford Catholic family linked to the Hathaways.


9 For Harsnett’s comments on witchcraft, see Declaration, pp. 135–6. The relation between demonic possession and witchcraft is complex. John Darrel evidently had frequent recourse, in the midst of his exorcisms, to accusations of witchcraft whose evidence was precisely the demonic possessions; Harsnett marks wryly that “of all the partes of the trigcal Comedie acted between him and Somers, there was no one Scene in it, wherein M. Darrell did with more courage and boldnes acte his part, then in this of the discoverie of witches” (*A Discovery of the Fraudulent Practises of J. Darrel... concerning the pretended possession and dispossession of W. Somers, etc.* [1599], p. 142). There is a helpful discussion of possession and witchcraft, along with an important account of Harsnett and Darrel, in Keith Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971).

10 I borrow the phrase “central zone” from Edward Shils, for whom it is coterminous with society’s central value system, a system constituted by the general standards of judgment and action and affirmed by the society’s elite (*Center and Periphery*, p. 3). At the heart of the central value system is an affirmative attitude toward authority, which is endowed, however indirectly or remotely, with a measure of sacredness. “By their very possession of authority,” Shils writes, elites “attribute to themselves an essential affinity with the sacred elements of their society, of which they regard themselves as the custodians” (p. 5).


12 Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, p. 485. “This effectively put an end to the practice.” Thomas writes, “at least as far as conforming members of the Anglican Church were concerned.”


16 *A Report Contayning a brief Narration of certain diuellish and wicked witcheries, practized by Olisse Barthram alias Doll Barthram in the Country of Suffolke, bound with The Triall of Maist. Dorrell, or A Collection of Defences against Allegations not yet suffered to receive convenient answere* (1599), p. 94.
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18 The Triall of Maist. Dorrell, p. 29.
19 Quoted in [John Darrel,] *A Briefe Narration of the possession, dispossession, and repossession of William Sommers* (1598), pp. Diiv, Ciiiiv.
20 The Triall of Maist. Dorrell, p. 8.
22 Harsnett sees this argument as a variant on the exorcists’ general rule that “when the deuilles are cast out of man, they endeououre by all the means they can, to perswade, that hee was neuer in them: that so the partie being vntthankefull to God for his deliuerance, they might the better reenter into him” (*Discovery*, p. 72). Harsnett cites the important exorcism manual by R. F. Hieronymus Mengus [Girolamo Menghi], *Flagellum Daemonum* (Bologna, 1582).
23 In 1524 Erasmus satirized exorcism by depicting it not simply as a fraud but as a play in five acts (*Exorcismus, sive spectrum*, in *The Colloquies of Erasmus*, trans. Craig R. Thompson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 231–7). The play, in Erasmus’s account, is an elaborate practical joke played on a character called Faunus, a gullible and pretentious parish priest who is cleverly induced to be an unwitting actor in an outlandish and grotesque theatrical performance. The representation of the demonic is spurious, but its effect on the victim of the joke is alarmingly real: “So thoroughly did this fancy obsess him that he dreamt of nothing but specters and evil spirits and talked of nothing else. His mental condition carried over into his very countenance, which became so pale, so drawn, so downcast that you would have said he was a ghost, not a man” (p. 237). A successful demon play can fashion the dreams of its victims, and illusions can inscribe themselves in the very bodies of those who believe in them.

The colloquy ostensibly celebrates the histrionic cunning of the jokers, but Erasmus makes it clear that there are larger institutional implications: a gifted director, an unscrupulous actor who has “perfect control of his expression,” and a few props suffice not only to create an intense illusion of the demonic among large numbers of spectators but also to entice the gullible into participating in a play whose theatricality they cannot acknowledge. The defense against such impostures is a widespread public recognition of this theatricality and a consequent skepticism: “Up to this time I haven’t, as a rule, had much faith in popular tales about apparitions,” one of Erasmus’s speakers concludes, “but hereafter I’ll have even less” (p. 237).
26 [Richard Baddeley,] *The Boy of Bilson, or A True Discovery of the Late Notorious Impostures of Certaine Romish Priests in their pretended Exorcisme, or expulsion of the Diuell out of a young Boy, named William Perry, sonne of Thomas Perry of Bilson* (London: F. K., 1622), p. 51. Baddeley is quoting from the Catholic account of the events, which, in order to dispute, he reprints: *A Faithful Relation of the Proceedings of the Catholike Gentlemen with the Boy of Bilson; shewing how they found him, on what terme they meddled with him, how fare they proceeded with him, and in what case, and for what cause they left to deale further with him* (in Baddeley, pp. 45–54).
27 In both England and France the reliability of the devil’s testimony was debated extensively. “We ought not to beleue the Diuell,” writes the exorcist and inquisi-
tor Sebastian Michaelis, “yet when hee is compelled to discourse and relate a truth, then wee should fear and tremble, for it is a token of the wrath of God” (Admirable Historie of the Possession and Conversion of a Penitent Woman, p. C7v). Michaelis’s long account of his triumph over a devil named Verrine was published, the translator claims, to show “that the Popish Priests, in all Countries where men will beleue them, are vniforme & like vnto themselves, since that which was done couertly in England, in the daies of Queene Elizabeth, by the Deuils of Denham in Sara Williams and her fellowes, is now publikely taken vp elsewhere by men of no small ranke” (A4r). This seems to me a disingenuous justification for publishing, without further annotation or qualification, over five hundred pages of Catholic apologetics, but obviously the Jacobean licensing authorities accepted the explanation.


29 “Let him be brought before some indifferent persons, let the depositions be read, and let him act the same in such maner, and forme as is deposed, by naturall, or artificiall power, then Mr. Dorrell will yeeld that he did conterfeit. It he cannot, (as vndoubtedlie he cannot,) then pleade no longer for the Deuill; but punish that imp of Satan as a wicked lier, and blasphemer of the mightie worke of God” (Briefe Narration, p. Biiv).

30 Booke of Miracles, quoted in Harsnett, Declaration, pp. 113–14.

31 In Haiti, for example, an individual possessed by a loa, or spirit, is led to the vestry of the sanctuary, where he chooses the costume appropriate to the particular spirit that has possessed him; dressed in this costume – for Baron Saturday, a black suit, starched cuffs, top hat, and white gloves; for the peasant god Zaka, a straw hat, pouch, and pipe; and so forth – he returns to the clearing and performs for the assembled crowd the appropriate mimes, monologues, and dances (Alfred Metraux, “Dramatic Elements in Ritual Possession,” Diogenes 11 (1964): 18–36). In Sri Lanka, exorcisms integrate feasting, the making of ritual offerings, dancing, the singing of sacred texts, drumming, masking, and the staging of improvised, frequently obscene, comedies. The comedies are at once explicitly theatrical and integral to the healing process.

In a major study of exorcism rituals performed in and near the town of Galle in southern Sri Lanka, Bruce Kapferer observes that demons in Sinhalese culture are understood to operate by means of illusions; the disorder and suffering that these illusions occasion are combated by spectacular demystifying counter-illusions. Hence exorcists “consider their healing rites to be elaborate tricks which they play on demons”: to induce demons to treat the illusory as reality is to gain control over them (Bruce Kapferer, A Celebration of Demons: Exorcism and the Aesthetics of Healing in Sri Lanka (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 112). Demonic possession has disturbed a hierarchical order that must be restored by humiliating the demons and returning them to their rightful subordinate position in the order of things. This restoration is achieved through ceremonies that “place major aesthetic forms into relation and locate them at points when particular transformations in meaning and experience are understood by exorcists to be occurring or are to be effected” (p. 8). The ceremonies transform demonic identity into normal social identity; the individual is returned to himself and hence to his community whose solidarity is not only mirrored but constituted by the aesthetic experience. Exorcists then are “the masters of illusion” (p. 113), and their histrionic skills do not arouse doubts about their authenticity but heighten confidence in their powers.


This argument has the curious effect of identifying all exorcisms, including those conducted by nonconformist preachers, with the pope. On attacks on the Catholic church as a theater, see Jonas Barish, *The Antitheatrical Prejudice* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 66–131 passim.

At least since Plato there has been a powerful tendency to identify the stage with unreality, debased imitation, and outright counterfeiting. Like the painter, says Socrates in the *Republic*, the tragic poet is an imitator of objects that are themselves imitations and hence “thrice removed from the king and from the truth” (597e). Though this position had its important Christian adherents, it is not, of course, the only intellectual current in the West; not only do medieval mystery plays depend upon a conviction that dramatic performance does not contradict religious truth, but the Mass itself appears to have been conceived by several important medieval thinkers as analogous to theatrical representation. For further discussion, see my “Loudun and London,” pp. 328–9.

Discovery, p. A3r. As Catholic priests “have transformed the celebrating of the Sacrament of the Lords supper into a Masse-game, and all other partes of the Ecclesiastical service into theatricall sights,” writes another sixteenth-century Protestant polemicist, “so, in steece of preaching the word, they caused it to be played” (John Rainolds, cited in Barish, *The Antitheatrical Prejudice*, p. 163).

Harsnett was not alone, of course. See, for example, John Gee: “The Jesuits being or having Actors of such dexterity, I see no reason but that they should set up a company for themselves, which surely will put down The Fortune, Red-Bull, Cock-pit, and Globe” (John Gee, *New Shreds of the Old Snare* [London, 1624]). I owe this reference, along with powerful reflections on the significance of the public theater’s physical marginality, to Steven Mullaney.

This sentiment could serve as the epigraph to both of Harsnett’s books on exorcism; it is the root perception from which most of Harsnett’s rhetoric grows.


These lines were included in the quarto but omitted from the folio. For the tangled textual history, see Michael J. Warren, “Quarto and Folio *King Lear*, and the Interpretation of Albany and Edgar,” in *Shakespeare: Pattern of Excelling Nature*, ed. David Bevington and Jay L. Halio (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1978), pp. 95–107; Steven Urkowitz, *Shakespeare’s Revision of “King Lear”* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); and Gary Taylor, “The War in *King Lear*,” *Shakespeare Survey* 33 (1980): 27–34. Presumably, by the time the folio appeared, the point of the allusion to Harsnett would have been lost, and the lines were dropped.


Edgar’s later explanation – that he feared for his father’s ability to sustain the shock of an encounter – is, like so many explanations in *King Lear*, too little, too late.

42 On “counterfeit miracles” produced to arouse awe and wonder, see especially Harsnett, *Discovery*, Epistle to the Reader.

43 Words, signs, gestures that claim to be in touch with super-reality, with absolute goodness and absolute evil, are exposed as vacant – illusions manipulated by the clever and imposed on the gullible.

44 This is, in effect, Edmund Jorden’s prescription for cases such as Lear’s, in *A brief discourse of a disease*.

45 “It is even possible,” writes Peter Milward, S.J., “that the lot of such priests as Weston and Dibdale provided Shakespeare with a suggestion for his portrayal of Edgar in hiding” (*Shakespeare’s Religious Background* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1973), p. 54). But I cannot agree with Milford’s view that Shakespeare continually “laments ‘the plight of his poor country’ since the day Henry VIII decided to break with Rome” (p. 224).

46 On the Yorkshire performance, see John Murphy, *Darkness and Devils*, pp. 93–118.

47 In willing this disenchantment against the evidence of our senses, we pay tribute to the theater. Harsnett has been twisted around to make this tribute possible. Harsnett several times characterizes exorcism as a “tragicomedy” (*Discovery*, p. 142; *Declaration*, p. 150). On Harsnett’s conception of tragicomedy, see Herbert Berry, “Italian Definitions of Tragedy and Comedy Arrive in England,” *Studies in English Literature* 14 (1974): 179–87.


50 Richard Hooker, *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, 1:582–3. This truth, which is the triumph of the metaphorical over the literal, confers on the church the liberty to use certain names and rites, even though they have been abolished. The entire passage in Hooker is powerfully suggestive for understanding the negotiation between the domain of literature and the domain of religion:

They which honour the Law as an image of the wisdom of God himself, are notwithstanding to know that the same had an end in Christ. But what? Was the Law so abolished with Christ, that after his ascension the office of Priests became immediately wicked, and the very name hateful, as importing the exercise of an ungodly function? No, as long as the glory of the Temple continued, and till the time of that final desolation was accomplished, the very Christian Jews did continue with their sacrifices and other parts of legal service. That very Law therefore which our Saviour was to abolish, did not so soon become unlawful to be observed as some imagine; nor was it afterwards unlawful so far, that the very name of Altar, of Priest, of Sacrifice itself, should be banished out of the world. For though God do now hate sacrifice, whether it be heathenish or Jewish, so that we cannot have the same things which they had but with impiety; yet unless there be some greater let than the only evacuation of the Law of Moses, the names themselves may (I hope) be retained without sin, in respect of that proportion which things established by our Saviour have unto them which by him are abrogated. And so throughout all the writings of the ancient Fathers we see that the words which were do continue; the only difference is,
that whereas before they had a literal, they now have a metaphorical use, and are so many notes of remembrance unto us, that what they did signify in the letter is accomplished in the truth. And as no man can deprive the Church of this liberty, to use names whereunto the Law was accustomed, so neither are we generally forbidden the use of things which the Law hath; though it neither command us any particular rite, as it did the Jews a number and the weightiest which it did command them are unto us in the Gospel prohibited. (4.11.10)

For the reference to Hooker I am indebted to John Coolidge.

“Truth to tell,” writes Barthes, “the best weapon against myth is perhaps to mythify it in its turn, and to produce an artificial myth: and this reconstituted myth will in fact be a mythology” (Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), p. 135).